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"TAKING" THE TIME TO LOOK BACKWARD
James E. Brookshire*
The laboratory for the evolution of the Takings Clause' has principally
been the courtroom, where our judicial system balances the government's
assertion of power and the individual's need for protection on a case-by-case
basis. In this judicial laboratory, the essential focus is rightly on the justice
of the particular case.2 Because regulatory takings analysis is decidedly ad
hoc, turning on factors like government action, impact, and remaining value
in the particular dispute, substantive takings case law is developed case by
case, a tapestry woven thread by thread.
There have, no doubt, been times when a thread had to be pulled; all in
all, however, the progress has been steady. That is the most important les-
son: through many challenges, our society has managed the evolution. With
that confidence, we can see that, although debates of great import should be
vigorous, the ultimate emphasis is on the underlying principle.
It has always been wise to proceed with caution in attempting to draw
lessons from history. Although the particular historian may remain objec-
tive and conscientious, the student of history must make his or her own
judgment. It is no more appropriate to measure the evolution of a body of
law-especially a body of constitutional law-by a single case than it is to
judge the merit of a life's contribution by a single day.
Today's regulatory takings allegations are a far cry from the relatively
routine physical takings claims of the past. They arise in a myriad of set-
tings, including areas such as housing and rent regulation,' savings and loan
* The author is Vice-Chair of the Takings Committee of the Court of Federal Claims
Bar Association and Treasurer of the Federal Circuit Bar Association. Mr. Brookshire cur-
rently serves as Deputy Chief, General Litigation Section, Environment and Natural Re-
sources Division of the United States Department of Justice. The structure and contents of
this Article express the author's own views and are in no way expressive of, or binding upon,
the Department of Justice. The author expresses his appreciation to Marc A. Smith and
Timothy Dowling for their thoughtful and constructive comments on the Article.
1. U.S. CONST. amend V.
2. In Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), the Court stated that fairness and
justice require compensation in order to avoid "forcing some people alone to bear public bur-
dens which . . . should be borne by the public as a whole." Id. at 49.
3. Yee v. Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992); Seawall Assocs. v. New York, 542 N.E.2d
1059 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 976 (1989).
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regulation,4 user fees,5 wetlands protection,' mining and minerals,7 hazard-
ous substances,8 and recreational trails.9
Thus, to understand fully the Supreme Court's Taking Clause jurispru-
dence, this Article turns to the history of the Clause and traces its evolution.
First, this Article describes situations where society faced the fundamental
threat raised by war and balanced that concern with the perception of an
obligation to compensate. Next, this Article traces the case law developed in
response to society's extraordinary commercial growth. Third, this Article
focuses on one segment of the Court's land use-oriented takings jurispru-
dence. There, a shift occurred in takings analysis from questions of due pro-
cess and the lawfulness of government power to tests that seem, by and
large, to assume the governmental authority to face the challenge and focus
instead on the issue of compensability.
I. TIMES OF WAR
In times of war, the relationship between the need to have each member of
society contribute to the nation's defense and the individual's right to re-
cover for compensable loss is most clearly illustrated. In several early cases
outlined below, the United States Supreme Court found cognizable damage
where the consumption or destruction of materials provided a resource to
our soldiers. In Mitchell v. Harmony,"0 the Court found that a wagoneer/
4. California Housing Sec., Inc. v. United States, 959 F.2d 955 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 324 (1992).
5. United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52 (1989).
6. Ciampitti v. United States, 22 CI. Ct. 310 (1991); Dufau v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct.
156 (1990); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 CI. Ct. 153 (1990) (appeal pending);
Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 21 Ci. Ct. 161 (1990) (appeal pending); Wedinger v.
Goldberger, 522 N.E.2d 25 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 850 (1988).
7. Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir.) (currently pending
in the United States Court of Federal Claims on various jurisdictional, allocational, and new
trial motions), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991); Skaw v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 7 (1987),
aff'd, 847 F.2d 842 (Fed. Cir.), and cert. denied, 488 U.S. 854 (1988); Freese v. United States,
639 F.2d 754 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981); Iowa Coal Mining Co. v. Monroe
County, 494 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2415 (1993).
8. Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Littman v. Gimello, 557
A.2d 314 (N.J.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 934 (1989).
9. Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1 (1990).
10. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1852), overruled by Penhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halder-
man, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). The Mitchell Court explained that:
There are, without doubt, occasions in which private property may lawfully be taken
possession of or destroyed to prevent it from falling into the hands of the public
enemy; and also where a military officer, charged with a particular duty, may impress
private property into the public service or take it for public use. Unquestionably, in
such cases, the government is bound to make full compensation to the owner ....
Id. at 134. In Penhurst, the Court described Mitchell as an action for tort damages against a
military officer. Penhurst, 465 U.S. at 111 n.21.
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trader was entitled to compensation when, during the Mexican-American
War, he was forced to accompany an American military expedition into
Mexican territory and his supplies were destroyed."
Similarly, in United States v. Russell,'2 the Court found that the owner of
steamboats requisitioned for service during the Civil War was entitled to
"full compensation" for such services. 3 Speaking in terms of contract and
taking, the Court reasoned that "[p]rivate rights, under such extreme and
imperious circumstances, must give way for the time to the public good, but
the government must make full restitution for the sacrifice.14
Conversely, where action was necessary to avoid the threat of disease to
troops, the Court held that the government need not compensate a party for
the destruction of buildings occupied in enemy territory. In Juragua Iron
Co. v. United States, 5 a commander of United States troops during the
Spanish-American War ordered the destruction of buildings and their con-
tents in the "enemy country" of Cuba.' 6 The buildings were potentially con-
taminated with Yellow Fever and posed a health threat to American forces
stationed within the structures.' 7 The Court found no application of the
Tucker Act' 8 based on the party's failure to state a claim under implied
contract. ' 9 Moreover, there was no "convention" that would compel com-
pensation for a destruction related solely to the protection of lives of soldiers
actively engaged in war.2°
In United States v. Pacific Railroad,2' the Court considered whether the
federal government could charge a private railroad company for expenses
incurred by the government in constructing railroad bridges later destroyed
during the Civil War.2 2 Union forces destroyed at least two bridges to stop
11. Mitchell, 54 U.S. at 137.
12. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1871).
13. Id. at 631.
14. Id. at 629.
15. 212 U.S. 297 (1909).
16. Id. at 298-99.
17. Id. at 301.
18. ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982)).
19. Juragua Iron, 212 U.S. at 302. The Court stated that "[m]anifestly, no action can be
maintained under [the Tucker Act] unless the United States became bound by implied contract
to compensate the plaintiff for the value of the property destroyed." Id. Because the act of
destruction might only give rise to a tort claim against the government, specifically excluded
from the Tucker Act, "the court would, of course, have no jurisdiction under the act of Con-
gress." Id. at 309.
20. Id. at 309.
21. 120 U.S. 227 (1887). Note that, although alluding to the Takings Clause, the Court
states that "the seizure and appropriation of private property under such circumstances by the
military authorities may not be within the terms of the [Takings Clause]." Id. at 239.
22. Id. at 228-30.
1993]
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the advance of Confederate troops.23 Concluding that the railroad could not
receive compensation, the Court addressed in dicta the issue of whether the
United States would have been required to compensate for the destruction of
the railroad bridges.2 4 The Court reasoned that "[w]hile the government
cannot be charged for injuries to . . . private property caused by military
operations of armies in the field ... the converse of the doctrine is equally
true that private parties cannot be charged for works constructed on their
lands by the government to further operations of its armies." 25
In United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc. ,26 United States military au-
thorities ordered the destruction of petroleum facilities in Manila during the
Japanese advance following the attack on Pearl Harbor.2 7 Although Ameri-
can officials had paid for the petroleum used to aid the defense of Manila and
the subsequent retreat, they did not pay for the value of the destroyed termi-
nal facility that otherwise would have fallen into the hands of the enemy.
28
With respect to the issue of compensability, the majority reasoned that the
military's purpose was "to the sole objective of destroying property of strate-
gic value to prevent the enemy from using it to wage war the more success-
fully."29 Accordingly, the Court denied compensation.3 °
The rules of compensability on the "home front" were no less case spe-
cific. In United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co. ,3 the War Production
Board of 1942 ordered non-essential gold mines to cease production for the
purpose of conserving materials and manpower for the war effort.3 2 In re-
23. Id. at 231.
24. Id. The Court stated:
Military necessity will justify the destruction of property, but will not compel private
parties to erect on their own lands works needed by the government, or to pay for
such works when erected by the government. The cost of building and repairing
roads and bridges to facilitate the movement of troops, or the transportation of sup-
plies and munitions of war, must, therefore, be borne by the government.
Id. at 239.
25. Id. The Court also stated:
Whatever would embarrass or impede the advance of the enemy, as the breaking
up of roads, or the burning of bridges, or would cripple and defeat him, as destroying
his means of subsistence, were lawfully ordered by the commanding general .... The
safety of the state in such cases overrides all considerations of private loss.
Id. at 234.
26. 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
27. Id. at 150-51.
28. Id. at 151.
29. Id. at 153.
30. Id. at 156. The Caltex Court relied directly on the reasoning in United States v.
Pacific Railroad, 120 U.S. 227 (1887). See also National Bd. of YMCA v. United States, 395
U.S. 85 (1969) (denying compensation where buildings were occupied in the midst of armed
conflict and occupied by American soldiers for their protection at the invitation of the owner).
31. 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
32. Id. at 156.
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sponse to the claim that the order constituted a taking of the right to mine
gold, the Court recognized that regulation could, in the proper setting, give
rise to a taking.33 In this case, however, the governmental efforts to redirect
gold mining operations to more "essential" war efforts were non-compensa-
ble.34 The Court advised:
In the context of war, we have been reluctant to find that degree of
regulation which, without saying so, requires compensation to be
paid for resulting losses of income. The reasons are plain. War,
particularly in modem times, demands the strict regulation of
nearly all resources. It makes demands which otherwise would be
insufferable. But wartime economic restrictions, temporary in
character, are insignificant when compared to the widespread un-
compensated loss of life and freedom of action which war tradi-
tionally demands.35
Notably, the mine owners in Central Eureka expected to redirect their
mining equipment from non-essential gold mining to more essential wartime
operations. In contrast, in United States v. Pewee Coal Co. ,36 the military
actually assumed possession and operation of the coal mines when the work-
ers threatened to strike.37 There, the Court found a taking under the Fifth
Amendment,38 and awarded compensation.39
33. Id. at 168.
34. Id. at 166. The Court found that the government sought only "to encourage volun-
tary reallocation of scarce resources from the unessential to the essential," id., by making gold
miners available for other work "if they chose to move," id. at 167, and by "conserv[ing] the
limited supply of equipment used by the mines." Id. at 169.
35. Id. at 168 (citations omitted).
36. 341 U.S. 114 (1951).
37. Id. at 115.
38. Id. at 116-17. Cf. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 284-85 (1947)
(holding, for the purposes of determining district court jurisdiction to enjoin a labor strike,
that the United States seized control of certain bituminous coal mines as fully "as if the Gov-
ernment held full title and ownership").
39. Pewee Coal, 341 U.S. at 117. In determining the level of compensation due, the Court
stated:
Where losses resulting from operation of property taken must be borne by the
Government, it makes no difference that the losses are caused in whole or in part by
compliance with administrative regulations requiring additional wages to be paid.
With or without a War Labor Board order, when the Government increased the
wages of the miners whom it employed, it thereby incurred the expense. Moreover, it
is immaterial that governmental operation resulted in a smaller loss than Pewee
would have sustained if there had been no seizure of the mines. Whatever might
have been Pewee's losses had it been left free to exercise its own business judgment,
the crucial fact is that Government chose to intervene by taking possession and oper-
ating control. By doing so, it became proprietor and, in the absence of contrary
agreements, was entitled to the benefits and subject to the liabilities which that status
involves.
Id. at 118-19.
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II. COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Commercial growth in the United States over the past 200 years has been
nothing short of extraordinary. It has been a history replete with periods of
economic success, economic panic and collapse, and an increasingly regu-
lated structure in which economic benefits are frequently adjusted. As citi-
zens more regularly called upon the government to assume commercial
management burdens, we again had occasion to weave threads balancing
those burdens with the Takings Clause obligation.
Noble State Bank v. Haskell' ° presented an early police power challenge
arising under the Takings Clause. There, the Oklahoma State Banking
Board levied a one percent assessment against the Bank's average daily de-
posits in order to establish a Depositor's Guaranty Fund.4' The fund was to
provide full repayment of deposits in the event a bank became insolvent.42
The Court acknowledged the "logical" proposition that an assessment re-
moved monies from the bank.43 It found, however, two more compelling-
and contrary-propositions."
First, it accepted that "comparatively insignificant" intrusions for a pri-
vate purpose might be justified by an ulterior public purpose.45 Second, as
the Court stated:
[T]here may be other cases beside the every day one of taxation, in
which the share of each party in the benefit of a scheme of mutual
protection is sufficient compensation for the correlative burden
that it is compelled to assume.46
The Court continued:
The power to compel, beforehand, cooperation, and thus, it is be-
lieved, to make a failure unlikely and a general panic almost impos-
sible, must be recognized, if government is to do its proper work,
40. 219 U.S. 104, amended, 219 U.S. 575 (1911).




45. Id. at 110 (citing: Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 315 (1907) (finding a state statute
restricting grazing of sheep on public lands constitutional); Oflield v. New York, N.H. & H.
R.R., 203 U.S. 372 (1906) (holding that a state may provide for condemnation of minority
shares in a railroad if public interest so requires); Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co.,
200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906) (involving a statute that permitted the lawful condemnation of an
aerial bucket line by a mining corporation); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905) (involving a
statute that permitted the condemnation by an individual of a ditch to provide water for his
land)).
46. Id. at 111.
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unless we can say that the means have no reasonable relation to the
end.4 '
During the years of the Great Depression, the reality of a society
faced with fundamental economic collapse focused squarely on the Takings
Clause. Again, the cases were police power challenges.4" In 1934, Con-
gress's Economy Act4 9 denied benefits due individuals under War Risk In-
surance policies, directing that "all laws granting or pertaining to yearly
renewable term insurance [were] repealed."5 Policy beneficiaries chal-
lenged the Act as effecting takings.5 In Lynch v. United States, 2 the Court
accepted that the policies were motivated by a "benevolent" rather than
profit oriented motive.5 3 Nonetheless, it viewed the undertakings as "legal
obligations of the same dignity as other contracts of the United States."54
Seeing the legislation as motivated solely by an attempt to lessen government
expenditures, the Court invalidated it."
In 1935, the Court, in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,
5 6
considered the Frazier-Lemke Act, 7 legislation that modified interests of
individual mortgagees of farming property in bankruptcy proceedings.58
47. Id. at 112 (citations omitted). In a wonderful paragraph, Justice Holmes responds to
criticism that the Court was on its way to line-drawing:
It is asked whether the State could require all corporations or all grocers to help to
guarantee each other's solvency, and where we are going to draw the line. But the
last is a futile question, and we will answer the others when they arise. With regard
to the police power, as elsewhere in the law, lines are pricked out by the gradual
approach and contact of decisions on the opposing sides.
Id.
48. See infra part III.A
49. Law of March 20, 1933, ch.3, 48 Stat. 8.
50. Id. § 17, 48 Stat. at II.
51. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 573 (1934).
52. 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
53. Id. at 576. "The policies granted insurance against death or total disability without
medical examination ... the United States bearing the whole expense of administration and
the excess mortality and disability cost resulting from the hazards of war." Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. (citing United States v. Central Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 235 (1886)). Commenting on
the power of Congress to reduce fiscal expenditures, the Court stated:
Congress was free to reduce gratuities deemed excessive. But Congress was without
power to reduce expenditures by abrogating contractual obligations of the United
States. To abrogate contracts, in the attempt to lessen government expenditure,
would be not the practice of economy, but an act of repudiation. "The United States
are as much bound by their contracts as are individuals. If they repudiate their obli-
gations, it is as much repudiation, with all the wrong and reproach that term implies,
as it would be if the repudiator had been a State or a municipality or a citizen."
Id. at 580 (quoting The Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 719 (1878)).
56. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
57. ch. 869, 48 Stat. 1289 (1934).
58. Id. The plaintiff's counsel observed:
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Those mortgagees sued to invalidate the Act as an unconstitutional taking.5 9
Reasoning that the Act took mortgage rights under Kentucky law (e.g., the
right to retain the lien, to bid at a judicial sale of the property), the Court
concluded that "however great the Nation's need, private property shall not
be thus taken even for a wholly public use without just compensation. "
60
The Court's view was not unequivocal. In the same year, it addressed a
federal statute reducing the government's responsibility to meet its obliga-
tions in gold.6 ' The Department of the Treasury refused to pay to the holder
of a $10,000 bond "'payable in United States gold coin of the present stan-
dard of value' "the value of the bond in gold. Instead, it offered to pay only
currency value.62 The holder sought to invalidate the statute on a taking
theory. The Court refused.6 3
That action the Congress was entitled to take by virtue of its au-
thority to deal with gold coin as a medium of exchange. And the
restraint thus imposed upon holders of gold coin was incident to
the limitations which inhered in their ownership of that coin and
gave them no right of action.'
Still, a decision like the 1935 Frazier-Lemke ruling placed the Court's
view of Takings Clause protection in the middle of New Deal efforts to re-
vive the economy. Something had to give. Only two years later, after the
Court's confrontation with President Roosevelt, it reviewed a newly refor-
mulated Frazier-Lemke.'" This time, the result was dramatically different.
Analyzing five compensability indicators identified in the 1935 decision, the
Court found that the new Act "sought to preserve to the mortgagee all of
these rights so far as essential to the enjoyment of his security. ' 66 The
amended Act effected no taking.6 7
The Frazier-Lemke Act is bottomed on principles entirely alien to established bank-
ruptcy law. It is specifically directed against mortgages and other secured creditors,
and was enacted for the very purpose of depriving them of the collateral for which
they had bargained and of giving it to the farmer-debtor.
Radford, 295 U.S. at 560; see also id. at 575-76 (discussing elements of the Act).
59. Id. at 574.
60. Id. at 602. The Court added:
If the public interest requires, and permits, the taking of property of individual mort-
gagees in order to relieve the necessities of individual mortgagors, resort must be had
to proceedings by eminent domain; so that, through taxation, the burden of the relief
afforded in the public interest may be borne by the public.
Id.
61. Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
62. Id. at 346- 47.
63. Id. at 347.
64. Id. at 356 (citation omitted).
65. Act of August 28, 1935, 49 Stat. 943-45.
66. Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440, 457 (1937).
67. Id. at 470.
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Some twenty-seven years later, society addressed a different kind of
landmark legislation. This time, Congress responded to race-related inequi-
ties with the passage of the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964.68 The legis-
lation required equal treatment and equal access in enterprises engaged in
interstate commerce. 69 Among the challenges raised against Title II of the
Act, the legislation's public accommodations provisions, was a theory that
its provisions "took" an enterprise's "property right" to choose customers
and operate its affairs as it wished.7° The Court rejected the taking theory,
on grounds consistent with a view that expectations in an enterprise affected
by the public interest in interstate commerce did not include the "property
right" to discriminate.7"
In 1984, the Court decided a constitutional challenge to the Federal Insec-
ticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).72 In Ruckelshaus v. Mon-
santo Company,73 the Court described the Federal Environmental Pesticide
Control Act of 1972,"4 which "transformed FIFRA ... into a comprehen-
sive regulatory statute," as the product of "mounting public concern about
the safety of pesticides and their effect on the environment" and the "grow-
ing perception that the existing legislation was not equal to the task of safe-
guarding the public interest.""
In 1972, Congress added a new regulatory criterion to determine whether
the pesticide would cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the environ-
ment.",76 These provisions addressed the use of health, safety, and environ-
mental data provided by pesticide registration applicants." Between 1972
and 1978, FIFRA enabled the applicant to request non-disclosure of trade
secret data.78 In 1978, a new provision authorized, inter alia, the disclosure
68. 78 Stat. 241, 243.
69. Section 201(a).
70. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). The Court in
Heart of Atlanta, relied on prior Takings Clause decisions for support. See, e.g., United States
v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States,
261 U.S. 502 (1923) (finding that the government requisition of a steel manufacturer's produc-
tion did not constitute a taking, but "frustrated" customer's purchase contract); Legal Tender
Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 550 (1871) (stating that the Takings Clause has "never been
supposed to have any bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to
individuals"; a new valuation of gold for legal tender effected no taking).
71. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 259-61.
72. Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
(1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
73. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
74. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
75. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 991 (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 992 (citing the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-516, §§ 3(c)(5)(C)-(D), 86 Stat. 973, 980-981 (1971)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 993.
1993]
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of health, safety, and environmental data, notwithstanding trade secret sta-
tus. 79 For that intervening period, and with no emphasis given to the public
health and safety thrust of the legislation, the Court found that the statute
formed the "basis of a reasonable investment-backed expectation" and that
Monsanto might be able! to show a taking related to the release of the infor-
mation. o Given the availability of the Tucker Act8 1 money remedy for any
taking by the United States, the Act, as it was challenged in Ruckelshaus,
was not unconstitutional.
8 2
In its social support programs, Congress, in the Social Security Amend-
ments of 1983,83 repealed a provision of the previous statute (known as the
"termination clause") that allowed states to withdraw their employees from
the Social Security system upon advance notice to the Secretary of Health
and Human Services. 4 The states were tied to the system by the statute and
by related contracts with the federal government.8 5 Congress was concerned
that the increasing rate of state withdrawals from the system threatened its
integrity.86 Various states challenged the amendment as taking rights as-
sured under their federal contracts.
8 7
The Court, in Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrap-
ment 8 ' focused on a provision of the original Social Security Act which re-
served Congress's " 'right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision.' 89
From this language, the Court reasoned that Congress had reserved not only
the authority to amend the termination section itself, but also the right to
modify agreements under the Act.90 In the face of the reserved right to
79. Id. at 994.
80. Id. at 1010-11.
81. Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982)). The
Tucker Act grants the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction "upon any claim against the
United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any relevant
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the
United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort." 28
U.S.C. § 1491(a)(i) (1982).
82. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1019.
83. Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 103(a), 97 Stat. 71 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 418(g) (1988)). Com-
pare 42 U.S.C. § 418(g)(1) (1976).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 418(g)(1) (1982) (repealed 1983).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 418(a)(1) (1988).
86. H.R. REP. No. 25, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N.
219, 236; STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., TERMINA-
TION OF SOCIAL SECURITY COVERAGE FOR EMPLOYEES OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERN-
MENTS & NONPROFIT GROUPS 13-14 (Comm. Print 1982).
87. Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
88. 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
89. Id. at 52 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 418(g)(1) (1935)).
90. Id. at 53-54 (citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 470
U.S. 451, 456 (1985) (stating that Congress "'expressly reserved' its right to 'repeal, alter, or
amend' the Act at any time"); The Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700 (1878) (stating that a
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Looking Backward
amend, the Court rejected the view that the "contractual" termination right
was a property right protected by the Takings Clause.9' Indeed, the Court
reminded us that " 'sovereign power, even when unexercised, is an enduring
presence' " in expectancies and it need not be expressly reserved. 92
Under another statute, the pension fund employer "withdrawal liability"
provisions of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 198093
required employers withdrawing from a plan's pension pool to pay their pro-
portionate share of its "unfunded vested benefits." 94 Employers faced with
this obligation mounted a challenge to the statute by citing the Takings
Clause. The Supreme Court, in Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guarantee
Corp. 9 5 considered the Act's withdrawal requirements in a facial Takings
Clause challenge.96 Applying a three-tiered takings analysis, the Court
viewed the economic impact as proportional to the employer's experience
with the plan, the character of the action as "economic regulation," and the
interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations as de mini-
mus-given the early notice to employers that their plans would be regu-
federal statute governing the railroads' obligations to the United States on subsidy bonds ex-
pressly reserved the authority to alter, repeal, or amend)).
91. Id. at 54-56.
92. Id. at 52 (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982)).
93. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1461 (1988).
94. Id. §§ 1381, 1391.
95. 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
96. Id. at 221-28.
19931
Catholic University Law Review
lated.9 7 In this facial challenge to the statute, the Court found no
taking.98
During the 1992 Term, the Court in Concrete Pipe & Products, Inc. v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust99 again addressed the "withdrawal
penalty" provisions of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of
1980. "o Although the decision in Concrete Pipe was similar to Connolly in
that the company withdrawing from the pension plan raised substantive,
procedural, and takings challenges, the challenges in Concrete Pipe were "as
applied" and not "facial" claims arising from the mere enactment of the
legislation.' ° ' Again, the taking issue focused on the company's "with-
drawal" liability.'° 2 A collective bargaining Trust Agreement between Con-
crete Pipe and the union which predated enactment of the statute limited the
company's obligations to contributions to which it had already agreed.'0 3
97. Id. Analyzing the Act on the first level of analysis, the Court stated that:
[T]he Act safeguards the participants in multiemployer pension plans by requiring a
withdrawing employer to fund its share of the plan obligations incurred during its
association with the plan. This interference with the property rights of an employer
arises from a public program that adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good and, under our cases, does not constitute a taking requir-
ing Government compensation.
Id. at 225 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978);
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15, 16 (1976)). The Court then addressed
the issue of the severity of the economic impact of the Act. The Court concluded that
[t]he assessment of withdrawal liability is not made in a vacuum, however, but di-
rectly depends on the relationship between the employer and the plan to which it had
made contributions. Moreover, there are a significant number of provisions in the
Act that moderate and mitigate the economic impact of an individual employer's
liability. There is nothing to show that the withdrawal liability actually imposed on
an employer will always be out of proportion to its experience with the plan, and the
mere fact that the employer must pay money to comply with the Act is but a neces-
sary consequence of the [Act]'s regulatory scheme.
Id. at 225-26 (footnote omitted). The Court concluded with the consideration of possible in-
terference with reasonable investment-backed expectations. It found that liability under the
statutory plan had existed in different forms during prior years, id. at 226-27, and stated that
"[p]rudent employers then had more than sufficient notice not only that pension plans were
currently regulated, but also that withdrawal itself might trigger additional financial obliga-
tions." Id. at 227.
98. Id. at 228.
99. 113 S. Ct. 2264 (1993).
100. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1391 (Supp. 11 1988).
101. Concrete Pipe, 113 S. Ct. at 2270.
102. Id. at 2272. The Court noted that:
An employer's withdrawal liability is its "proportionate share of the plan's 'unfunded
vested benefits,' " that is, "the difference between the present value of vested benefits"
(benefits that are currently being paid to retirees and that will be paid in the future to
covered employees who have already completed some specified period of service, 29
U.S.C. § 1053) "and the current value of the plan's assets. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1391."
Id. (quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 725 (1984)).
103. Id. at 2274.
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The Court turned to a three-tiered analysis. First, government action impos-
ing the penalty (notwithstanding the Trust Agreement) did not involve phys-
ical invasion or occupancy; instead, the character of the action was the
adjustment of the benefits and burdens of economic life."0 Neither did the
Court permit Concrete Pipe to bring itself within the "categorical liability"
rule. 10 The company could not, by arbitrarily narrowing the description of
the affected property to the piece allegedly taken, show a total loss of eco-
nomically viable use. 106 The appropriate denominator for the takings analy-
sis was the whole parcel of property in question. 107 The Court then focused
on the economic impact inquiry. Even assuming Concrete Pipe's allegation
that the penalty would require the payment of forty-six percent of share-
holder equity, the company had not shown "its withdrawal liability here to
be 'out of proportion to its experience with the plan.' ""' Moreover, "mere
diminution in the value of property, however serious, is insufficient to
demonstrate a taking.' 0 9 The Court finally turned to the reasonable expec-
tations inquiry. Pension plans had "long been subject to federal regulation"
at the time the company elected to do business in the regulated field. "o Em-
ployers subject to the statute already faced contingent liability on their plans
of up to thirty percent of net worth."' The company voluntarily brought
itself under the statute by its conduct and could have claimed no reasonable
104. Id. at 2290. The Court used the standard adopted in Connolly v. Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986), where the Court stated in the regulation of pension
plans "[t]his interference with the property rights of an employer arises from a public program
that adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good and...
does not constitute a taking." Id. at 225; see also supra note 99.
105. Concrete Pipe, 113 S. Ct. at 2290. The Court rejected Concrete Pipe's argument that
"the appropriate analytical framework is the one employed in our cases dealing with perma-
nent physical occupation or destruction of economically beneficial use of real property." Id.
106. Id. The Court criticized Concrete Pipe's attempt "to shoehorn its claim into this
[inappropriate] analysis." Id. The Court noted its previous rejection of similar attempts to
categorize the extent of a taking in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978), and stated that "[t]o the extent that any portion of property is taken,
that portion is always taken in its entirety; the relevant question, however, is whether the
property taken is all, or only a portion of the parcel in question." Concrete Pipe, 113 U.S. at
2290.
107. Id.; see also infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
108. Id. at 2291 (quoting Connolly, 475 U.S. at 226).
109. Id.; see also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (holding
that diminution in value of approximately 75% was insufficient to support a finding of a tak-
ing); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 143, 143 (1915) (finding reduction in value by 92.5%
did not constitute a taking).
110. Concrete Pipe, 113 S. Ct. 2291. The Court noted that ".those who do business in
the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amend-
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expectation that the penalty ceiling would not be raised." 2 In short, the
Court found no "as applied" taking.
Under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program," 
3
Congress provided for financial assistance to needy families." 4 The system
measured those benefits by factors such as the number of individuals in the
family and family income."' In the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,116 Con-
gress amended the AFDC program to require that calculation of a family's
eligibility for financial assistance include support payments received by any
family member." 7 The congressional amendments resulted in reduced bene-
fits for affected families." 8 In the face of a takings claim, the Court, in
Bowen v. Gilliard,"9 found no compensable expectancy in receiving gratui-
tous benefits at a certain level.' 20 The Court saw no substantial economic
impact on a child's support funds (citing, for example, an extra $50 contri-
bution which the family receives), no reasonable expectation to continued
identical support payments, and no compensable character of the action in a
decision to include child support as part of family income.' 2' The Court
112. The Court stated:
Because "legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it
upsets otherwise settled expectations ... even though the effect of the legislation is to
impose a new duty or liability based on past acts," Concrete Pipe's reliance on ER-
ISA's original limitation of contingent liability to 30% of net worth is misplaced,
there being no reasonable basis to expect that the legislative ceiling would never be
lifted.
Id. at 2292 (footnote omitted) (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16
(1976), superseded by statute as stated in Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Office of
Worker's Compensation Program, No. 91-1992, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 20098 (7th Cir. Aug.
4, 1993)).
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602, 603 (1982).
114. Id. § 601. The program is intended to "encourag[e] the care of dependent children in
their own homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State to furnish financial assist-
ance and rehabilitation and other services." Id.
115. Id. § 603(a).
116. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(A)-(B) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
118. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 594 & n.6 (1987). Under the amendment, the Court
found that:
[U]nder the July 1985 levels of payment in North Carolina, a family of four with no
other income would have received $269. A child's support income of $100 would
therefore reduce the family's AFDC payment to $169 if that child was included in
the filing unit. The family would have a net income of $269. But if the family were
permitted to exclude the child from the unit and only claim the somewhat smaller
benefit of $246 for a family of three, it could have collected that amount plus the
expected child's $100 and have a net income of $346.
Id. at 594 n.6.
119. 483 U.S. 587 (1987).
120. Id. at 604 ("Congress is not, by virtue of having instituted a social welfare program,
bound to continue it at all, much less at the same benefit level.").
121. Id. at 608-09.
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held, therefore, that the 1984 Act did not effect a taking without just
compensation. 122
III. LAND USE REGULATION
While the land use cases discussed below are by no means exhaustive, they
highlight three threads of takings jurisprudence, each reflecting an analytical
framework invoked by the Court. Two of the threads discussed here are also
evident in the takings analysis of other types of governmental action-the
due process inquiry and the current three-tier framework.123 The reach of
the remaining thread-the categorical taking-is not yet clear. Over time,
the courtroom laboratory will weave the answer to that question as it has
others-on a case-by-case basis.
A. Police Power and Due Process "Taking"
In the cases discussed below, the Court viewed the Takings Clause as a
limitation on the power of government to act in the first instance, a con-
straint on the lawfulness of an exercise of the police power.
In Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park,1 24 the company and the Illinois legislature
had negotiated a franchise under which the company could conduct a ferti-
lizer operation within the Hyde Park village limits.1 2 ' After issuance of the
franchise, the village passed an ordinance that prohibited transportation of
offal and animal waste through the village of Hyde Park, attaching criminal
penalties to such transportation. 26 A railroad engineer and railroad em-
ployees were subsequently prosecuted for violating the ordinance.' 27 The
resulting interruption of supplies, in the view of the company, frustrated the
primary purpose of the state-granted franchise-fertilizer manufacturing.'28
The company claimed that its charter, granted by the state legislature, pro-
tected it against enforcement of the Hyde Park ordinance.' 29 Accordingly,
the company unsuccessfully brought an action seeking to enjoin further en-
forcement of those provisions. 3°
Presented with state court dismissal of the action, the Supreme Court rea-
soned that lawful exercise of the police power rested "upon the fundamental
principle that every one shall so use his own as not to wrong and injure
122. Id. at 609.
123. See infra part III.B.I.
124. 97 U.S. 659, 667 (1878).
125. Id. at 663.
126. Id. at 665.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 666.
130. Id.
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another. To regulate and abate nuisances is one of [the police power's] ordi-
nary functions." '131 The lawfulness and non-compensability of the "interfer-
ence" in Fertilizer Co. was also informed by two additional factors. First,
the property interest at issue was a "franchise," a charter issued by legisla-
tive authority.' 32 Second, the company, consistent with its franchise and
notwithstanding the statute's restriction, could permissibly relocate outside
the village's jurisdiction and continue its business.' 33 The ordinance was
therefore held to be a lawful exercise of Hyde Park's police power. 134
Today's debates over one significant takings issue, the relationship be-
tween society's obligation to protect against threats to public health and
safety and the protection of just compensation, frequently begin with Mugler
v. Kansas.135 In Mugler, the state of Kansas prohibited the sale of intoxicat-
ing liquors by constitutional amendment.' 36 A subsequent statute also de-
fined places in which liquors were sold without permit as common nuisances
subject to closure. 137 Under the implementing legislation, Kansas indicted
and convicted Mugler for the manufacture (at a plant which predated the
Kansas law) and sale of intoxicating liquors without a permit.' 38 On appeal
to the United States Supreme Court, Mugler contended that enforcement of
the legislation was invalid because it violated his protections under the Con-
stitution, including the assurance of "compensation ... for the diminution in
the value of their property, resulting from such prohibitory enactments.'
' 39
The Court rejected Mugler's contention, concluding that the state's regula-
tion of liquor was "fairly adapted" to its ends and was not "under the guise
merely of police regulations ... aiming to deprive the citizen of his constitu-
tional rights."'"
131. Id. at 667.
132. Id. at 670.
133. Id. The Court concluded that
[.. t]here is a class of nuisances designated 'legalized.' These are cases which rest
for their sanction upon the intent of the law under which they are created, the para-
mount power of the legislature, the principle of 'the greatest good of the greatest
number,' and the importance of the public benefit and convenience involved in their
continuance .... This case is not within that category.
Id.
134. Id.
135. 123 U.S. 623, 661-62 (1887).
136. Id. at 655.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 656.
139. Id. at 664.
140. Id. at 662. The Court continued to reason that:
The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their prop-
erty as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is
not-and, consistently with the existence and safety of organized society, cannot
be-burdened with the condition that the State must compensate such individual
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In a similar context, the Court, in Sligh v. Kirkwood, 4' addressed a case
where the plaintiff in error was charged with violating a Florida statute mak-
ing it unlawful to sell, offer for sale, ship, or deliver for shipment citrus fruits
unfit for consumption.' 42 Alleging that the statute was an unconstitutional
exercise of state power in the realm of interstate commerce, the plaintiff filed
for a writ of habeas corpus.' 4 3 Focusing on the importance of the citrus
industry to Florida and on the public health and safety risks of shipping
immature fruit, the Court sustained the state's exercise of its police power.'
Similarly, in Reinman v. City of Little Rock,' 45 the Court addressed
whether a prohibition by the City of Little Rock, Arkansas, of a pre-existing
livery stable within the city limits was a lawful exercise of the state's police
power.' 46 The Court accepted the local government's prerogative to declare
"in particular circumstances and in particular localities a livery stable" to be
"a nuisance in fact and in law."' 14 7 The Court moved on to consider whether
the regulation was an "unreasonable and arbitrary" exercise of state power
in view of the allegedly large expense for removal of existing buildings and
the otherwise lawful conduct of the existing business.' 4 '
In its takings analysis, the Court found ambiguity in the record. The sta-
ble owner's allegations were denied by an answer, and trial was on the com-
owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reasons of their not being permitted,
by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the community.
Id. at 669.
141. 237 U.S. 52 (1915).
142. Id. at 57.
143. Id. at 58-59.
144. Id. at 61-62. The Court noted:
It was competent for the legislature to find that it was essential for the success of that
industry that its reputation be preserved in other States wherein such fruits find their
most extensive market .... The protection of the State's reputation in foreign mar-
kets, with the consequent beneficial effect upon a great home industry, may have been
within the legislative intent, and it certainly could not be said that this legislation has
no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of that purpose.
Id. The opinion does not allude to a takings inquiry but is, as we will see, at least referenced in
a significant later opinion on takings. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
145. 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
146. Id. at 177.
147. Id. at 176.
148. Id. at 177. The Court stated:
While such regulations are subject to judicial scrutiny upon fundamental grounds,
yet a considerable latitude of discretion must be awarded to the law-making power;
and so long as the regulation in question is not shown to be clearly unreasonable and
arbitrary, and operates uniformly upon all persons similarly situated in the particular
district, the district itself not appearing to have been arbitrarily selected, it cannot be
judicially declared that there is a deprivation of property without due process if law,
or a denial of the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. (citations omitted).
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plaint, exhibits, answer and demurrer. ' 49 In its answer, the city alleged that
the business was conducted in a careless manner, caused offensive odors, and
was productive of disease.' 5° The state supreme court included no discus-
sion of its factual rationale. 5 ' Invoking "general principles," the United
States Supreme Court inferred that the state court adopted "such a basis of
fact as would most clearly sustain its judgment."' 5 2 In essence, the Court
assumed the facts as stated in the answer, presumably concluding that con-
duct potentially "productive of disease"' 153 was a lawful topic for police
power exercise, notwithstanding the high costs associated with its
prevention. '
5 4
In Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 155 a landowner's brickyard operation predated
a city ordinance prohibiting the manufacture of bricks within the city lim-
its. 1-6 The surrounding residential neighborhood had become seriously "in-
commoded" by the yard owner's brick manufacturing enterprise. 
57
Continuing to operate the facility after passage of the ordinance, the yard
owner was convicted of a misdemeanor for violation of the city ordinance. 
5 8
The Court rejected the brick manufacturer's defense that the exercise of the
police power was defective because it violated the Equal Protection Clause
and would effect an uncompensated loss of the use of property.' 59 Deferring
to the state supreme court's findings on the reasonableness of the regulation,
149. Id. at 178-80.
150. Id. at 178.
151. Id. at 178-79.
152. Id. at 180. The Court invoked the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch 20, 1 Stat. 86 (1789), and
noted that subsequent amendments omitted language restricting the Court to the record. Id.
at 179. The Court noted that "because of [the amendments] it has since been held that this
court is not so closely restricted as before to the face of the record to ascertain what was
decided in the state court, and may examine the opinion ... so far as may be useful in deter-
mining that question." Reinman, 237 U.S. at 179.
153. Reinman, 237 U.S. at 178.
154. Id. at 180.
155. 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
156. Id. at 404-05.
157. Id. at 409.
158. Id. at 404-05.
159. Id. at 405, 412. The Court stated:
It is to be remembered that we are dealing with one of the most essential powers of
government, one that is the least limitable. It may, indeed, seem harsh in its exercise,
usually is on some individual, but the imperative necessity for its existence precludes
any limitation upon it when not exerted arbitrarily. A vested interest cannot be as-
serted against it because of conditions once obtaining. To so hold would preclude
development and fix a city forever in its primitive conditions. There must be pro-
gress, and if in its march private interests are in the way they must yield to the good
of the community.
Id. at 410 (citation omitted).
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the Court found that the significant reduction in value was not a compensa-
ble interference with the owner's expectations. 1"
In Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 61 the Court reviewed dismissal
of a complaint seeking injunctive relief against an ordinance passed by the
City of Des Moines.' 62 The ordinance established a process for the prohibi-
tion, as a "public nuisance," of dense smoke in certain parts of the city.' 6 3
The Court sustained the ordinance ("short of a merely arbitrary enact-
ment") against constitutional objections."
Against the backdrop of the cases discussed above, modem regulatory
takings discussions usually begin with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon .,65
In Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes advised that "while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking."' 6 6 Pennsylvania Coal raised the validity, as a constitutional
exercise of the police power, of Pennsylvania's Kohler Act.'6 7 The Act
sought to regulate subsurface coal mining in order to avoid surface subsi-
dence and damage. 168 Justice Holmes concluded that the statute sought to
benefit one private house and therefore lacked the requisite "public interest"
sufficient to "warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant's constitu-
tionally protected rights."' 69 In his view, the Act purported to abolish the
160. Id. at 405.
161. 239 U.S. 486 (1916).
162. Id. at 489-90.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 492. Moreover, the Court stated: "Nor is there any valid Federal constitutional
objection in the fact that the regulation may require the discontinuance of the use of property
or subject the occupant to large expense in complying with the terms of the law or ordinance."
Id. (citing Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 394;
Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915) (holding that a state statute requiring
railroads to maintain water drainage in ditches along right of ways across private property did
not constitute a taking)).
165. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
166. Id. at 415. The Court reasoned that:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could
not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. As long
recognized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to
the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or the
contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining
such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in
most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensa-
tion to sustain the act. So the question depends upon the particular facts. The great-
est weight is given to the judgment of the legislature, but it always is open to
interested parties to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its constitutional
power.
Id. at 413.
167. Id. at 398.
168. Id. at 412-13.
169. Id. at 414.
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reserved right to mine, and, therefore, could not be sustained as a valid exer-
cise of the police power. 70
Four years later, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. ,' the Court
considered a facial challenge to a local zoning ordinance that forbade con-
struction businesses and apartment houses in a residential area.172 Evaluat-
ing the "lawfulness" of this exercise of the police power, the Court reasoned
that the law of nuisances would inform the inquiry. 7 ' The Court found a
reasonable relationship between the health and safety objective of the zoning
regulation and its impact.' 74 Accordingly, it sustained the ordinance against
a Takings Clause challenge.' 75
One of the most celebrated Takings Clause discussions arises from the
case of Miller v. Schoene. 176 In Miller, the state of Virginia was forced to
enact statutory measures in the face of a severe agricultural threat. 177 Dis-
eased cedar trees were producing cedar rust that, in turn, threatened nearby
apple trees, "one of the principal agricultural pursuits in Virginia."'178 In
response, the Virginia legislature passed the Cedar Rust Act, a statute which
required the destruction of infected cedars but at the same time, made no
provision "for the value of the standing cedars or the decrease in the market
value of the realty caused by their destruction."' 179 Under the state process,
after a determination by the state entomologist that the trees were the source
(or "host plant[s]") of ceder rust and constituted threats to the health of
nearby apple orchards, the ceder trees would be ordered cut down. 8 ° The
statute did provide that the owner of the cedars could seek judicial review.' 8
The state circuit court could " 'hear the objections' " and " 'pass upon all
question involved.' "182 In doing so here, the state court afforded the owners
170. Id. The Court reasoned that:
What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with profit.
To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same
effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it. This we think
that we are warranted in assuming that the statute does.
Id. at 414-15.
171. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
172. Id. at 379-80.
173. Id. at 387-88.
174. Id. at 395.
175. Id. at 397. The Court acknowledged that a later specific application of the ordinance
might demonstrate the ordinance to be arbitrary and unreasonable. Id. at 395.
176. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
177. Id. at 277.
178. Id. at 277, 279.
179. Id. at 277.
180. Id. at 278.
181. Id. at 277-78.
182. Id. at 278.
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$100 to cover the cost of removal."' 3 Under the procedure, the owners were
also allowed to retain the felled trees.i"4 This process, as applied to Miller,
did not, in the Court's view, effect a taking without just compensation any
more than prior cases.1 85
Nectow v. City of Cambridge 186 dealt with an "as applied" challenge to a
local regulation. 8 7 In Nectow, a property owner contended that the city's
ordinance deprived him of all "practical" residential use, leaving his land
with "comparatively little value." ' The Court invalidated the application
of the ordinance, ruling that it did not promote the "health, safety, conven-
ience, and general welfare."' 89
B. Compensability
1. The Emerging Three-Tier Test
In today's compensation analysis, the takings challenge is more a question
of the compensability of the impact of government power on the owner's
expectations and less a question of whether the governmental action is a
legitimate exercise of power. In that setting, at least one test of compen-
sability-which this Article will refer to as "three-tier" analysis-has gained
widespread use.
For instance, in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 9 0 the Supreme Court
sustained an ordinance that prohibited further mining excavation at an ex-
isting quarry and required the refill of any excavation below the regulated
level. "' The effect of the ordinance was to prohibit completely a use that
183. Id. at 277.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 279-80. The Court reasoned:
It will not do to say that the case is merely one of a conflict of two private interests
and that the misfortune of apple growers may not be shifted to cedar owners by
ordering the destruction of their property; for it is obvious that there may be, and
that here there is, a preponderant public concern in the preservation of the one inter-
est over the other.
Id. at 279 (citing Perley v. North Carolina, 249 U.S. 510 (1919); Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S.
311 (1907); Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267 (1904)).
186. 277 U.S. 183, 187 (1928).
187. Id. at 185.
188. Id. at 187.
189. Id. at 188. The Court explained:
The governmental power to interfere by zoning regulations with the general rights of
the land owner by restricting the character of his use, is not unlimited, and other
questions aside, such restriction cannot be imposed if it does not bear a substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
Id. (citing City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926)).
190. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
191. Id. at 592.
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predated the ordinance by thirty-two years.' 92 Using a deferential rational
basis police power analysis, the Court was prepared to evaluate the ordi-
nance as "a safety measure."1 93 The Court looked to (1) "the nature of the
menace" which the ordinance would correct, (2) "the availability and effec-
tiveness of other less drastic . . . steps," and (3) the loss suffered by the
ordinance's imposition of a "safety measure."' 94 The Court found the rec-
ord to be "clearly indecisive."' 95 In the face of the ambiguous record and in
deference to the governmental rationales, the Court found sufficient reason-
able basis to sustain the ordinance as a legitimate exercise of the police
power. 196
Sixteen years later a similar inquiry led to the development of the three-
tier balancing test used in analyzing most contemporary regulatory takings
questions. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 97 the
Court considered the character of the governmental action, its economic im-
pact, and the extent to which it interfered with distinct, investment-backed
expectations.' 98 As to the character of the governmental action, the Court
found that the New York Landmarks Preservation Law at issue required
preservation of building exteriors and was "substantially related" to the pro-
motion of public health, safety, and general welfare.' 99 The Court went on
to measure the diminution resulting from the legislation's economic impact
against the property's value as a whole, concluding that the law did not in-
terfere with Penn Central's "primary expectation concerning the use" of the
property, did not preclude development, and did not otherwise interfere with
existing uses. 2° The Court held that the law "not only permit[ted] reason-
able beneficial use of the landmark site but also afford[ed] ... opportunities
192. Id. at 591-92.
193. Id. at 595.
194. Id.
195. Id. The Court stated:
A careful examination of the record reveals a dearth of relevant evidence on these
points. One fair inference arising from the evidence is that since a few holes had been
burrowed under the fence surrounding the lake it might be attractive and dangerous
to children. But there was no indication whether the lake as it stood was an actual
danger to the public or whether deepening the lake would increase the danger. In
terms of dollars or some other objective standard, there was no showing of how
much, if anything, the imposition of the ordinance would cost the appellants.
Id.
196. Id. at 596 (citing Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959); Sal-
sburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 553 (1954); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, 154 (1938)).
197. 438 U.S. 104, 133 (1978).
198. Id. at 130-31.
199. Id. at 138.
200. Id. at 136-37.
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further to enhance not only the Terminal site proper but also other
properties.
20 1
The following year, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,20 2 the Court con-
fronted an assertion by the Army Corps of Engineers of federal jurisdiction
under Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act.20 3 That provision prohib-
ited the unauthorized construction of obstructions in the "navigable capacity
of any of the waters of the United States. 2' °4 The developer initially re-
quested a Section 10 permit and was advised by the Corps that one was
unnecessary.20 5 The developer subsequently expended significant resources
in developing a private pond in Hawaii.20 6 When the developer eventually
sought to connect the pond to navigable waters, the Corps required a permit
and public access to the pond. 20 7  Referencing the three-tiered test, the
Court characterized the action as an attempt to "create a public right of
access to the improved pond" and stressed that the right to exclude others
was a central right of ownership. 208 In the Court's view, the action re-
sulted in, essentially, an "actual physical invasion of the privately owned
"2090
marina. ,, °
In Agins v. City of Tiburon,2 1 frequently cited for its ripeness ruling, the
Court also made a reference that has become important to the development
and reconciliation of two lines of taking analysis. In Agins, the Court sum-
marized its takings tests as allowing for the conclusion that a taking exists in
201. Id. at 138.
202. 444 U.S. 164, 178 (1979).
203. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1988).
204. Id.
205. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 147.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 168.
208. Id. at 178. The Court noted:
We have not the slightest doubt that the Government could have refused to allow
such dredging on the ground that it would have impaired navigation in the bay, or
could have conditioned its approval of the dredging on the petitioners' agreement to
comply with various measures that it deemed appropriate for the promotion of navi-
gation. But what petitioners now have is a body of water that was private property
under Hawaiian law, linked to navigable water by a channel dredged by them with
the consent of the Government. While the consent of individual officials representing
the United States cannot "estop" the United States, it can lead to the fruition of a
number of expectancies embodied in the concept of "property"--expectancies that, if
sufficiently important, the Government must condemn and pay for before it takes
over the management of the landowner's property. In this case, we hold that the
"right to exclude," so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property
right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without
compensation.
Id. at 179-80 (citation and footnote omitted).
209. Id. at 180.
210. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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either of two instances: "If the ordinance does not substantially advance le-
gitimate state interests, or [if it] denies an owner economically viable use of
his land.",
2 11
In 1977, Congress addressed the topic of surface mining in the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA),2 12 which required
steep slope mine operators, inter alia, to reclaim those slopes after mining by
returning them to their approximate original contours. 213 The Act also pro-
hibited surface mining outright in certain areas-for example, in national
forests and national parks--except for those interests that could establish
themselves as "preexisting," or valid existing, rights (VERs).2 14 In a broad
spectrum challenge raised against SMCRA, the Court, in Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 2 15 also considered a facial taking
claim against the Section 522(e) restrictions contained in 30 U.S.C.
§ 1272(e).216 It concluded that the "mere enactment" of the legislation did
not deprive the mineral owners of "economically viable use.",2 17 In sum,
economic impact effecting a "mere diminution" in value was insufficient to
require compensation under the Takings Clause.218
Some sixty-five years after Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,219 the Court
revisited surface mining in Pennsylvania in the context of a takings chal-
lenge. In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,2 2 ° the Court em-
ployed a three-tier analysis, balancing the economic impact, the interference
with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
governmental action.2 2' In analyzing the character of the governmental ac-
211. Id. at 260 (citations omitted). The Agins language hinted at two separate ways of
establishing takings liability. The first of the two tests arose in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987).
In Agins, the property owners had the opportunity to submit a further proposal to local
authorities for approval. As a result, the Court had no "final"-or crystallized-action as to
which it could judge the impact. Agins, 447 U.S. at 262-63; see also MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986) (holding that the absence of a final administra-
tive decision precludes any taking analysis); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (stating that a taking claim was not ripe until an adminis-
trative agency makes a final determination on the application of the appropriate regulation to
the plaintiff's property).
212. Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445 (1977) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-
1320 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
213. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b) (1982).
214. Id. § 1272(e).
215. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
216. Id. at 268.
217. Id. at 297.
218. Id.
219. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
220. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
221. Id. at 485-93.
[Vol. 42:901
Looking Backward
tion, the Court focused on the public nuisance purposes of the new legisla-
tion, distinguishing what Justice Holmes viewed as the "private" purpose of
protecting one house.222
Emphasizing the importance of the character of the governmental action,
the Court expressed a "hesitance to find a taking when the State merely
restrains uses of property that are tantamount to public nuisances,, 223 hold-
ing that this view was "consistent with the notion of 'reciprocity of advan-
tage' that Justice Holmes referred to in Pennsylvania Coal.' '224 The Court
explained:
Under our system of government, one of the State's primary ways
of preserving the public weal is restricting the uses individuals can
make of their property. While each of us is burdened somewhat by
such restrictions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions
that are placed on others.2 25
The Keystone Court then focused on the three-tier balancing analysis. In
contrast to Holmes's finding in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court in Keystone did
not find a loss of economically viable use; the economic impact from mere
enactment of the state legislation was minimal. 226 Finally, the Court found
that the record failed to show interference with the landowner's investment-
222. Id. at 487-91. The Court distinguished the basis for its holding in Pennsylvania Coal:
Thus, the Subsidence Act differs from the Kohler Act [discussed in Pennsylvania
Coal] in critical and dispositive respects. With regard to the Kohler Act, the Court
believed that the Commonwealth had acted only to ensure against damage to some
private landowners' homes. Justice Holmes stated that if the private individuals
needed support for their structures they should not have "take[n] the risk of acquir-
ing only surface rights." Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416. Here, by contrast, the
Commonwealth is acting to protect the public interest in health, the environment,
and the fiscal integrity of the area. That private individuals erred in taking a risk
cannot estop the Commonwealth from exercising its police power to abate activity
akin to a public nuisance. The Subsistence Act is a prime example that "circum-
stances may so change in time ... as to clothe with such a [public] interest what at
other times ... would be a matter of purely private concern."
Id. at 487-88 (alteration in original) (quoting Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155 (1921)).
223. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491.
224. Id. The Court added that "It]he special status of this type of state action can also be
understood on the single theory that since no individual has a right to use his property so as to
create a nuisance or otherwise harm others, the state has not 'taken' anything when it asserts
its power to enjoin the nuisance activity." Id. at 491 n.20.
225. Id. (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 144-50 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S.
306, 320 (1905) (holding that the exclusive privilege to dispose of garbage did not take, for
compensation purposes, the householders' interest in the garbage)).
226. Id. at 495-96. The Court noted that "petitioners have never claimed that their mining
operations, or even any specific mines, have been unprofitable since the Subsidence Act was
passed. Nor is there evidence that mining in any specific location affected by the 50% rule has
been unprofitable." Id. at 496.
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backed expectations.227 As a result, the Court implicitly sustained the exer-
cise of the police power (in contrast to Pennsylvania Coal) and then pro-
ceeded to find no facial taking under the three-tier inquiry.
228
2. The Categorical Taking
In 1992, the Supreme Court formulated yet another regulatory taking test.
This thread of takings jurisprudence addressed the infrequent situation in
which the property owner suffers a loss of all economic value.
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,2 29 the Court explored the
relationship between legislation addressing beach erosion (and related con-
cerns) and the expectations of beach property owners. 230 Lucas concerned
two beachfront lots, Lots 22 and 24, on the Isle of Palms in South Carolina.
Between 1957 and 1963, these tracts were in fact under water.23' Between
1963 and 1973, the shoreline was 100 to 150 feet landward of the effected
property's seaward line.232 In 1973, stable vegetation extended about one-
half of the property's landward distance.
2 3
In 1977, South Carolina passed the Coastal Zone Management Act. 3
The enactment required individuals wishing to develop property in desig-
nated "critical areas" for uses other than those existing on the date of enact-
ment (September 28, 1977) to receive a state permit.235 In 1978, Lucas, who
would be a contractor, manager, and part owner of the "Wild Dunes" devel-
opment on the Isle of Palms, took up residence on the Isle.
2 36
Paying $975,000 in 1986, Lucas purchased Lots 22 and 24, two of the
remaining Wild Dunes lots. 237 He intended to build a single-family resi-
dence on each, one for speculation and one for occupancy. 238 Lots 22 and
227. Id. at 498-502. The petitioners pointed to the states 50% rule that required them to
leave unmined approximately 27 million tons of coal as evidence in support of the taking. The
Court rejected the petitioner's contention, stating that "[tjhe 27 million tons of coal do not
constitute a separate segment of property for takings law purposes." Id. The Court concluded
that "[w]hen the coal that must remain beneath the ground is viewed in the context of any
reasonable unit of petitioners' coal mining operations and financial-backed operations, it is
plain that petitioners have not come close to satisfying their burden of proving that they have
been denied the economically viable use of their property." Id. at 499.
228. Id. at 493-502.
229, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
230. Id. at 2889.
231. Id. at 2905 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-10 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
235. Id. § 48-39-130(A).





24 did not fall within the 1977 Act's "critical areas., 239 As a result, Lucas
was not required to secure a South Carolina Coastal Council permit at the
time he purchased the lots. Finally, the lots adjoining those purchased by
Lucas already had houses built on them.24
In March, 1987, a specially-appointed Blue Ribbon Committee concluded
that South Carolina's beaches were critically eroding and proposed further
land use restrictions.24' In response, the state legislature passed the Beach-
front Management Act on July 1, 1988.242 Lots 22 and 24 were located
along an "inlet erosion zone," defined by the 1988 Act as "a segment of
shoreline along or adjacent to tidal inlets which is influenced directly by the
inlet and its associated shoals., 2 43 By definition, the area was not "stabilized
by jetties, terminal groins, or other structures.",2 " Although the 1988 Act
retained the same restrictions within "critical areas," it expanded the areas
subject to that designation-including the area between the mean high water
and a "setback" line based on the "best available scientific and historical
data., 245 Under the Act, the setback line for such an area was located at a
point forty times the distance of the annual erosion rate landward of the
crest of an ideal oceanfront dune.246
The Act prohibited occupiable improvements seaward of a line located
twenty feet landward of the setback, or baseline.247 Certain uninhabitable
improvements such as "wooden walkways no larger in width than six feet"
and "small wooden decks no larger than one hundred forty-four square feet"
were permissible.248 The Act and location of the setback line landward of
Lots 22 and 24 effectively precluded any permanent habitable structures on
those parcels.249 Lucas filed suit in state court, accepting the validity of the
South Carolina legislature's findings of purpose for the Act but contending
that the prohibition against improvements effected an uncompensated tak-
ing.25° The state trial court concluded that the Act had taken all economic
value from the two tracts, thereby " 'depriv[ing] Lucas of any reasonable
economic use of the lots ... eliminat[ing] the unrestricted right of use, and
239. Id. at 2889 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
240. Id.
241. Id. at 2905 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
242. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
243. Id. § 48-39-270(7).
244. Id. § 48-39-280(A)(2).
245. Id. § 48-39-280(A).
246. Id.
247. Id. § 48-39-290(A).
248. Id. § 48-39-290(A)(1)-(2).
249. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2889-90 (1992).
250. Id. at 2890.
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render[ing] them valueless,'" holding that just compensation in the amount
of $1,232.387.50 was due.251
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court focused on Lucas's conces-
sion of validity of the legislative findings.252 In the absence of an attack on
those findings, the state court viewed itself as bound by them.25 3 Citing the
Mugler line of cases, the court pointed to the state legislature's findings that
the restrictions avoided public harm.254 Accordingly, the court reasoned
that because the government regulation precluded a public harm, it did not
effect a taking.255 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.256
The Court began with the observation that, prior to Justice Holmes's rul-
ing in Pennsylvania Coal, the Takings Clause "was generally thought" to
reach only a "direct appropriation of property,, 25 7 or the "functional
equivalent of a 'practical ouster of [the owner's] possession.' ,,258 Concerns
over the "natural tendency of human nature," led Justice Holmes to his the-
sis that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. 259 The Court then turned to
its first significant ruling-the articulation of categorical taking liability. It
pointed to "two discrete categories of regulatory action [viewed] as compen-
sable without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in sup-
port of the restraint. ,260 The first category involved "regulations that
compel the property owner to suffer a physical 'invasion' of his property.
261
For permanent physical invasions, the Court voiced reaffirmation of its
premise that compensation is due, irrespective of the "weighty public pur-
251. Id. (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at 37, Lucas (No. 91-453)).
252. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991), rey'd, 112 S. Ct.
2886 (1992).
253. Id. at 898.
254. Id. at 899-902.
255. Id. at 902. The South Carolina Supreme Court observed:
•.. [Mierely because the State acts within its police powers does not end the in-
quiry. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Supreme Court has time and again
held that when a State merely regulates use, and acts to prevent a serious public
harm, there is no "taking" for which compensation is due. It is therefore the way the
police power is exercised that is of critical import. Were we to adopt Lucas' argu-
ment, whether the State acts pursuant to its police power would be wholly irrelevant.
Id. at 899-900 (citation omitted).
256. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991).
257. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2892 (citing Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 550
(1871)).
258. Id. (quoting Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879)).
259. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).




pose behind [the invasion]" or how "minute the intrusion" might be.262 The
second "discrete" category arose from the Court's historical considerations
of the Takings Clause.263 The Court reaffirmed the statement made "on nu-
merous occasions '' 26 that compensation is due "where regulation denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of land., 265 The Court expressed
an "abiding concern for the productive use of, and economic investment in,
land."
266
The Court highlighted two reenforcing premises for this rule. First,
"when no productive or economically beneficial use of land [was] permit-
ted ' 267 and when this "relatively rare situation[ ]" of deprivations of "all
economically beneficial uses" 268 occurred, the assumption that the legisla-
ture was simply "'adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life' " was
unwarranted.269 Second, the majority reasoned that a loss of all beneficial
use raised a "heightened risk that private property [was] being pressed into
some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public
harm., 27" The Court concluded that "when the owner of real property has
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of
262. Id. (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982));
see also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 & n.10 (1946) (holding that a physical
invasion of airspace constituted a taking).
263. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 (citing: Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,
834 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987) (dis-
cussed supra text accompanying notes 220-28); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclama-
tion Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1987) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 215-18)).
264. Id. at 2893-94.
265. Id. at 2893 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (discussed supra
text accompanying notes 210-211)).
Justice Scalia takes time to address what he believes to be Justice Blackmun's mistaken
characterization of the Court's prior takings cases. Id. at 2893 n.6. Justice Blackmun
comments:
The Court has indicated that proof that a regulation does not deny an owner eco-
nomic use of his property is sufficient to defeat a facial taking challenge. But the
conclusion that a regulation is not on its face a taking because it allows the land-
owner some economic use of property is a far cry from the proposition that denial of
such use is sufficient to establish a taking claim regardless of any other consideration.
Id. at 2911 n. 1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Scalia responded:
The cases say, repeatedly and unmistakenly, that " '[t]he test to be applied in consid-
ering [a] facial [takings] challenge is fairly straightforward. A statute regulating the
uses that can be made of property effects a taking if it "denies an owner economically
viable use of his land.' '
Id. at 2893 n.6 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclama-
tion Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 295-96 (1981) (quoting Agins, 447 U.S. at 260)).
266. Id. at 2895 n.8.
267. Id. at 2894.
268. Id.
269. Id. (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
270. Id. at 2895. The Court noted that "[t]he many statutes on the books, both state and
federal, that provide for the use of eminent domain to impose servitude on private scenic lands
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the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has
suffered a taking."27
The majority also pointed to the rule that would govern instances of less
than total loss.272 In such situations, the now established three-tier inquiry
would apply.27 3 There, the inquiry would focus on the "'economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant and.., the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations.' "274
The state court decision below reasoned that Lucas's decision not to chal-
lenge the legislative findings of the Beachfront Management Act meant that
Lucas, in essence, conceded them. 275 As a result, it found the Mugler line of
cases, "sustaining against Due Process and Takings Clause challenges the
State's use of its 'police powers' to enjoin a property owner from activities
akin to public nuisances," to be applicable. 276 The Supreme Court rejected
the South Carolina court's reasoning, placing a context and construction on
the Mugler line. 277 The Court explained that "'[h]armful or noxious use'
analysis was.., simply the progenitor of our more contemporary statements
that 'land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it "substantially ad-
vance[s] legitimate state interests." ' ".278
Because none of the earlier cases involved situations in which the regula-
tion "wholly eliminated the value of the claimant's land, '279 the Court rea-
soned that "it becomes self-evident that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a
preventing developmental uses, or to acquire such lands altogether, suggest the practical equiv-
alence in this setting of negative regulation and appropriation." Id.
271. Id. at 2895.
272. Id. at 2895 n.8.
273. Id.
274. Id. (quoting Penn Central, 483 U.S. at 124). The Court added:
It is true that in at least some cases the landowner with 95% loss will get nothing
while the landowner with total loss will recover in full. But that occasional result is
no more strange than the gross disparity between the landowner whose premises are
taken for a highway (who recovers in full) and the landowner whose property is
reduced to 5% of its former value by the highway (who recovers nothing). Takings
law is full of these "all-or-nothing" situations.
Id. at 2895 n.8,
275. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 898 (1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
2886 (1992).
276. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2896-97 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962);
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)).
277. Id. at 2897. "The harmful or noxious uses principle was the Court's early attempt to
describe in theoretical terms why government may, consistent with the Takings Clause, affect
property values by regulation without incurring an obligation to compensate-a reality we
nowadays acknowledge explicitly with respect to the full scope of the State's police power."
Id. (citations omitted).
278. Id. (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (quoting
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980))).
279. Id. at 2899.
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touchstone to distinguish regulatory takings-which require compensa-
tion-from regulatory deprivations that do not require compensation.
280
As such, a noxious use analysis cannot be used to sidestep "our categorical
rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated."
'2
11
The Court's discussion in Lucas does not mean, however, that the health
and safety inquiry has become irrelevant in takings analysis. To the con-
trary, although the Court rejects the argument that "title is somehow held
subject to the 'implied limitation' that the State may subsequently eliminate
all economically valuable use,"'28 2 it nonetheless recognizes that "the
property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted,
from time to time, by various measures newly enacted by the State in legiti-
mate exercise of its police powers., 2 3 Similarly, the state's "traditionally
high degree of control over commercial dealings" would make an owner
aware that "new regulation might even render his property economically
worthless.
2 4
Looking to the practice in permanent physical occupation cases, the Court
recognized that, in that situation, it "would permit the government to assert
a permanent easement that was a pre-existing limitation upon the land-
owner's title.",2 ' From this analogy, it drew the new framework: "Any lim-
itation so severe [i.e, prohibiting all economically beneficial use of land]
cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must in-
here in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the
State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.,
286
280. Id.
281. Id. The Court noted:
The South Carolina Supreme Court's approach would essentially nullify Mahon's
affirmation of limits to the noncompensation exercise of the police power. Our cases
provide no support for this: None of them that employed the logic of "harmful use"
prevention to sustain a regulation involved an allegation that the regulation wholly
eliminated the value of the claimant's land.
Id.; see also Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (holding limitations on mining
rights to be within the police power and therefore not effecting a taking); Hadacheck v. Sebas-
tian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (holding a city ordinance prohibiting certain brick manufacturing to
be within the legitimate exercise of the police power); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S.
171 (1915) (affirming state court's determination that ordinance prohibiting operation of stable
within city limits was a valid exercise of the police power); Plymouth Coal Co. v. Penn-
sylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914) (finding state's regulation of coal mining to be within the legiti-
mate exercise of the police power); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (holding that state's
prohibitions on manufacture and distribution of alcoholic beverages to be within the police
power).
282. Id. at 2900.
283. Id. at 2899.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 2900.
286. Id. The Court defined "otherwise" as "litigation absolving the State... of liability for
the destruction of 'real and personal property, in cases of actual necessity, to prevent the
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Any new law or decree would avoid compensability, at least, if it duplicated
"the result that could have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent land-
owners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private
nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances
that affect the public generally, or otherwise.',
287
Among the objects of this "background principles" inquiry would be the
degree of harm to public lands and resources or adjacent private property
posed by the use, the social value of the activity and its suitability to the
location in question, and the ease of mitigating or avoiding the alleged
harm.28 8 Although longstanding use may indicate a common law endorse-
ment, new knowledge of harm may make that which was previously permis-
sible forbidden.289 For this case, however, "[ilt seems unlikely that common
law principles" would have forbidden construction of a house. 29 ° The state
would be required to "identify background principles of nuisance and prop-
erty law that prohibit the uses [Lucas] now intends in the circumstances in
which the property is presently found."' 2 9 1 With the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Lucas, we come, at least for our purposes, to the Court's current state
of work on the takings tapestry.
spreading of a fire' or to forestall other grave threats to the lives and property of others." Id.
at 2900 n.16 (quoting Bowditch v. City of Boston, 101 U.S. 16, 18-19 (1880)).
287. Id. The state may act to deny compensation when the owner's action falls into a
category of previously-restricted activities. Id. at 2900-01.
The use of the[ ] properties for what are now expressly prohibited purposes was
always unlawful, and (subject to other constitutional limitations) it was open to the
State at any point to make the implication of those background principles of nuisance
and property law explicit. In light of our traditional resort to "existing rules or un-
derstandings that stem from an independent source such as state law" to define the
range of interests that qualify for protection as "property" under the Fifth (and
Fourteenth) amendments, this recognition that the Takings Clause does not require
compensation when an owner is barred from putting land to a use that is proscribed
by those "existing rules or understandings" is surely unexceptional. When, however,
a regulation that declares "off limits" all economically productive or beneficial uses
of land goes beyond what the relevant background principles dictate, compensation
must be paid to sustain it.
Id. at 2901 (citations and footnote omitted) (quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
288. Id. at 2901.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 2901-02. The news media recently reported that South Carolina and Lucas
reached a settlement on the remanded case. According to reports, the state agreed to buy the
two lots for $425,000 each, and pay legal fees, back interest, and other related costs. WASH.




Whatever one's view of the proper role of the Takings Clause, this look
backward offers two lessons. First, it is to be expected that the relationship
of the majority's prerogative to rule and the Clause's protections will be
probed at significant moments in our societal growth. Second, as demon-
strated by cases in each of the three areas discussed in this Article, the
Supreme Court effectively-even pragmatically-found the relationship be-
tween that prerogative and those protections. No single case has had the
significance of being responsible for governing this constitutional inquiry for
long periods. Instead, the dimension of the Clause's protection has, as Jus-
tice Holmes put it, been "pricked out" over time.292 The genius of the sys-
tem lies in that lesson. That is a point for which it is worth taking the time
to look backward.
292. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 112, amended, 219 U.S. 575 (1911).
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